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SOME  IDEAS  OF  SENECA’S  ON  BEAUTY* 
 
It is no easy task to reconstruct a consistent aesthetical theory from 
Seneca’s writings. Even those scholars, such as Svoboda1, who uphold the 
existence of a Senecan aesthetics, must recognize that our philosopher never 
poses the question of the nature of the beautiful, which lies at the foundation 
of any aestethics. The lamented Italo Lana2 goes as far as stating that 
Seneca’s pronouncements about art – and particularly about poetry – are 
never based “upon criteria of aesthetical criticism, which is totally missing” 
(p. 378). Lana considered Svoboda’s essay nothing but a mere list of all 
Senecan passages which could somehow be linked with aesthetics (p. 378). 
In fact, the mobility of Seneca’s ingenium often causes him to touch on a 
subject from different points of view rather than tackling it directly and sys-
tematically. It remains true, however, that Seneca often proceeds well 
beyond the moralistic approach, which was not only typical of his school but 
also of his own ostensible attitude. I believe that, if only intermittently and 
sometimes perhaps unwittingly, Seneca does exceed his own moralistic 
premises and attains original and in many ways surprisingly ‘modern’ posi-
tions. I think I have demonstrated this in my books, at least as far as his lit-
erary theories are concerned. In this area the novelty of some of his positions 
always stems from the grafting of a serious philosophical approach onto the 
purely rhetorical method prevailing in the culture of contemporary Rome. 
Today, however, we intend to sketch a picture of a wider conceptual range, 
in which Seneca’s literary theories function as just one of several aesthetic 
elements – in other words to investigate his more general ideas about the 
beautiful in nature and art. 
We have just remarked that reconstructing an organic and consistent posi-
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tion from Seneca’s scattered statements is anything but an easy task. This is 
hardly surprising, given the almost deliberately unsystematic character of his 
writings. Nevertheless, it would surely be mistaken to think that his work 
was born in a vacuum; our analysis should never lose sight on the one hand 
of Stoic philosophy, to which Seneca constantly refers, and on the other of 
the more hotly debated questions in the contemporary cultural milieu. 
We shall commence from a somehow unusual passage, in which Seneca 
presents the reader with his ideal of feminine beauty: ep. 33.5 non est 
formosa illa cuius crus laudatur aut brachium, sed illa cuius universa facies 
admirationem partibus singulis abstulit (“a woman is beautiful not when 
one of her legs or her arms is praised, but when her whole figure does not 
permit to admire her separate parts”). In this formulation we recognize the 
ancient Greek conception of beauty, which had also been accepted by the 
Stoics. In fact, the Stoics placed the beauty of the body in the proportionate 
correspondence and harmony (summetriva) of the limbs with one another, 
according to Chrysippus’s definition: hJ d∆ ejn toi`" mevlesi summetriva h] 
ajsummetriva kavllo" h] ai\sco" (SVF III 471, p. 121, 29: “beauty and ugliness 
are the result of harmony or disproportion of the limbs”; cf. also SVF III 
472). Cicero added color: Tusc. 4.31 = SVF III 279 corporis est apta figura 
membrorum cum coloris quadam suavitate, eaque dicitur pulchritudo 
(“there exists a harmonious arrangement of the limbs in the body, joined 
with a pleasing color, and this is what is called beauty”). This definition 
given by Cicero seems to rely more on sense perception, in as much as it 
adds a purely visual element such as color. In Philo of Alexandria too we 
find a definition very close to Cicero’s3. Actually, Seneca seems to lay stress 
on the whole itself rather than on the harmony of the several parts; therefore, 
one might think that, rather than the summetriva of the old Stoics, he had the 
prevpon or decorum in mind, the idea of the “fitting”, which had also been 
inherited from ancient Greek conceptions, but had assumed a special and pe-
culiar importance at Rome, under the influence of Panaetius and of Cicero. 
In fact, the summetriva can be identified with the harmony of the limbs with 
one another, whereas the prevpon or decorum results more specifically from 
the several parts fitting the whole4. However, another definition of the 
beauty of the body by Chrysippus was couched in these terms: to; kavllo" 
tou` swvmatov"  ejsti  summetriva tw`n melw`n kaqestwvtwn aujtw`/  pro;"  
a[llhlav te kai; pro;" to; o{lon (SVF III 278: “the beauty of the body consists 
  
3 Cf. SVF III 392 to; me;n ga;r tou` swvmato" (kavllo") ejn summetriva/ merw`n kai; eujcroiva/ 
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227. 
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in the symmetry of its limbs in relation to one another and to the whole”). It 
is not necessary, therefore, to surmise that Seneca’s formulation diverges 
from the most orthodox tradition of Stoicism. 
In the passages of Chrysippus we have just quoted the definition of bodi-
ly beauty is followed by a similar definition of the beauty of the soul; the lat-
ter too is the result of a summetriva: the harmony of the mind and its “parts” 
or faculties in relation both to one another and to the soul as a whole (SVF 
III 278 to; th`" yuch`" kavllo" ejsti; summetriva tou` lovgou kai; tw`n merw`n 
aujtou` pro;" ãto;Ã o{lon te kai; pro;" a[llhla: cf. SVF III 279 and 471a). It is 
true, on the other hand, that Galen criticized Chrysippus, because, in his 
opinion, he had not clearly defined the nature of the parts whose balance and 
harmony was supposed to produce the beauty of the soul. 
This pairing of body and soul is important, in as much as it allows us to 
comprehend that, according to the Stoics, there was not, nor could ever be, 
any distinction between ethical beauty and aesthetical beauty, in the modern, 
and etymological, meaning of the word, that is “perceived by the senses”. 
Even in Cicero and Philo of Alexandria, where the purely visual notion of 
“color” is added to the more intellectual and, so to speak, “geometrical” and 
formal idea of harmony of the parts, the definition of bodily beauty is placed 
side by side with that of the beauty of the soul, with no perceptible trace of a 
qualitative distinction between the two. 
In fact, in Stoicism the source of all beauty is the Lovgo" which pervades 
the universe; there is no difference, therefore, between the good and the 
beautiful, nor between virtue and beauty. From this point of view we can 
truly say that the Stoics accepted and developed with the utmost consistency 
the ancient Greek equation which is expressed in the formula kalo;" kajga-
qov". Nor, according to them, can any qualitative difference be established 
between natural and artistic beauty: the former is the visible side of the cos-
mic Lovgo", the latter of the human lovgo", which, when it is “right” (ojrqo;" 
lovgo") is the faithful reflection of the former. Therefore, when Seneca re-
peats the old Greek idea that art is the imitation of nature – ep. 65.3 omnis 
ars naturae imitatio est –, his words must be read in the light of this Stoic 
position. We shall return to this later on. For the moment, we shall remark 
that, like the poet Horace (epist. 1.2.3), Seneca sometimes translates the 
Greek concept of kalovn with pulchrum, a term which remains within the 
aesthetical area, just like the Greek word. In a letter he writes: ad omne pul-
chrum vir bonus sine ulla cunctatione procurret (“the good man will run with 
no hesitation to everything that is beautiful”: ep. 66.12; cf. 67.6). The more 
usual translation of the Greek kalovn was rather honestum, “honorable”, a 
word originally related to the political domain. 
The cosmos in which we live is beautiful because it is the visible manifes-
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tation of the universal Lovgo". According to the Stoics’ monistic doctrine, ra-
tionality, the lovgo", does not reside in a world above our own, but unfolds 
itself in this one. A fragment of Posidonius’ states this idea explicitly: kalo;" 
oJ kovsmo":  dh`lon d∆  ejk tou` schvmato"  kai; tou` crwvmato" kai; tou` megev-
qou" kai; th`" peri; to;n kovsmon tw`n a[strwn poikiliva" (Posid.  F 364 
Theiler: “the cosmos is beautiful: this is evident from its shape, its colors, its 
size and the variety of the celestial bodies surrounding it”). And it was pre-
cisely the beauty of the cosmos which first suggested to men the idea of 
God. 
So, the beauty of nature was one of the basic principles of Stoic philo-
sophy; but Seneca adds to mere doctrine his personal receptivity to the fasci-
nation of natural sights. At times he even appears to anticipate the taste and 
sensitivity of the Romantic movement. In a passage of the Epistles he avows 
to be charmed by the beauty of dark forests and deep caves: ep. 41.3 si tibi 
occurrerit vetustis arboribus et solitam altitudinem egressis frequens lucus 
et conspectum caeli <densitate> ramorum aliorum alios protegentium 
summovens, illa proceritas silvae et secretum loci et admiratio umbrae in 
aperto tam densae atque continuae fidem tibi numinis faciet. Si quis specus 
saxis penitus exesis montem suspenderit, non manu factus, sed naturalibus 
causis in tantam laxitatem excavatus, animum tuum quadam religionis 
suspicione percutiet. Magnorum fluminum capita veneramur; subita ex 
abdito vasti amnis eruptio aras habet; coluntur aquarum calentium fontes, 
et stagna quaedam vel opacitas vel immensa altitudo sacravit (“if you find 
yourself in a forest thick with ancient trees exceeding the usual heigth, 
which obstructs the vision of the sky through several layers of branches 
placed one above the other, the height of the wood, its secluded location, 
and the marvel before a darkness so thick and continuous in the open 
wilderness will make you believe in a divine presence. If a cave, not an 
artificial one, but one whose wide hollowness has been produced by natural 
causes, has created a vast vault in the sheer rock, it will strike your soul with 
a religious shiver. The sources of great rivers receive a cult; where great 
veins of water erupt from hidden depths we erect altars; hot springs are also 
revered; some lakes are deemed to be sacred because of the darkness of their 
location or their unmeasurable depth”). 
This is an extremely complex passage. First of all we shall remark that 
the shiver, mid-way between aesthetic and religious, before wild and uncon-
taminated nature described in this page follows closely upon a Vergilian 
quotation which Seneca has introduced in order to illustrate the Posidonian 
idea of the inner god residing within each righteous man: ep. 41.2 in uno-
quoque virorum bonorum ‘(quis deus incertum est) habitat deus’ (Verg. 
Aen. 8.352: “inside every good man ‘a god dwells – we do not know which 
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one’”). In the Aeneid Euander refers these words to the wood and the rock of 
Capitol hill still in its wild, primeval condition, before the founding of 
Rome. According to a frequently employed procedure, which I have studied 
elsewhere a long time ago, here the philosopher transforms the original 
meaning of the poet’s words by assuming them as an integral part of his own 
discourse. In this instance he refers Virgil’s expression not to a physical 
place, as in the context of the poet, but to the soul of the good man. 
However, the suggestion created by the poetical context from which he ex-
tracts these words is still active, and urges Seneca to describe equally wild, 
uncontaminated places causing a religious shiver, just like Capitol hill in its 
primeval state does in the Aeneid. We should also observe that this descrip-
tion of uncontaminated nature serves as a foil for the ethical description, in 
the following paragraphs, of the good man, whose soul produces a similar 
religious shiver and an equal reverence. Here we are faced with a clear evi-
dence of the perfect equivalence of aesthetical and ethical beauty according 
to the Stoic conception we have mentioned before. 
One could object that the emotion described by Seneca in this page ap-
pears to be of religious rather than aesthetical nature. Roman religion did 
provide for worship of woods, springs, etc. And Quintilian, referring to 
Ennius, compares his outdated poetry to sacred woods, in quibus grandia et 
antiqua robora iam non tantam habent speciem quantam religionem (Quint. 
10.1.88: “where the great and ancient oak-trees by now appear more vener-
able than beautiful”). But that religious sensitivity does not exclude aesthetic 
sensitivity is demonstrated by another letter, in which the soul of the good 
and wise man is described in unequivocal terms of pulchritudo, which are 
joined with no apparent problem with allusions of religious nature: ep. 115.3 
si nobis animum boni viri liceret inspicere, o quam pulchram faciem, quam 
sanctam... videremus! (“if it were possible for us to see the soul of the good 
man, what a holy and beautiful vision that would be!”); and a little farther 
down (§ 5): nonne velut numinis occursu obstupefactus resistat...? 
(“wouldn’t he stop, as thunderstruck by the appearance of a god?”). In this 
passage too Seneca has recourse to Vergil to lend effectiveness to his de-
scription – he quotes the words by which Aeneas addresses his mother 
Venus before recognizing her, in the first book of the poem (ep. 115.5 ~ 
Verg. Aen. 1.327-328; 330). 
It is debatable to which extent the sensitivity apparent in Seneca for the 
fascination of wild, unspoiled nature is consciously joined by him with the 
one he surely harbors for ethical beauty and how far he is influenced by the 
Vergilian passage, which, in the original context, describes the sacredness, 
or better, the “numinous” character of a place – Capitol hill – still wild and 
lonely, but already marked by a mysterious holy aura, heralding its destiny 
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as the original seat of the eternal city. The philosopher often charges the 
poet’s words with new meanings and uses them to express in a striking and 
effective way his own thought. We should also add that he expressly op-
poses the natural caves found in wild mountains to the artificial grottoes one 
could see in Roman gardens (non manu factus, sed naturalibus causis in 
tantam laxitatem excavatus). However, can we really state that Seneca 
anticipates the Romantics’ taste and sensitivity? 
We can compare the passage of our letter with one from Cicero’s De 
natura deorum, which draws on Posidonius, or, according to Max Pohlenz5, 
on Panaetius. In this passage (nat. deor. 2.98) Cicero, while listing the 
beauties of the cosmos which are a proof of the presence of God, mentions, 
among other things, speluncarum concavas altitudines, saxorum asperitates, 
impendentium montium altitudines, immensitatesque camporum (“the deep 
hollow spaces of grottoes, the ruggedness of cliffs, the overhanging height 
of mountains, and the immensity of plains”). According to Cicero, even 
these wild places are an integral part of the pulchritudo rerum earum quas 
divina providentia dicimus constitutas (“of the beauty of what has been 
planned, as we say, by divine providence”), just as much as the pleasant 
sites and the things useful to men which God has placed in nature. In Seneca 
passages reminiscent of the spirit of this page of Cicero’s are not lacking. In 
the Consolatio ad Marciam the whole of chapter 18 is devoted to a 
description of the cosmos, which is defined from the outset as a city 
common to men and gods (Marc. 18.2 urbem dis hominibusque communem, 
which repeats the traditional Stoic definition povli" ejk qew`n kai; ajnqrwvpwn 
sunestw`sa: SVF II 528). Here, as in Cicero’s passage, we find a description 
of natural sights, including some details very close to Cicero’s: Marc. 18.4 
hinc camporum in infinitum patentium fusa planities, hinc montium magnis 
et nivalibus surgentium iugis erecti in sublime vertices (“on the one side the 
immensity of plains, on the other the summits of mountains rising to heights 
crowned with snow”). But both in the passage from the De natura deorum 
and in the one from the Consolatio ad Marciam the traits describing wild 
nature are not alone, but are accompanied by several others which sketch a 
cosmos created by providence for men. Both descriptions remind of one 
which could be made by a pleased landowner listing the beauties to be found 
in his property, including those lacking in practical usefulness. 
We shall not be wrong in concluding that Seneca, though receptive to the 
beauty of wild, uncontaminated nature, encloses it, nevertheless, within the 
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frame of a providential plan whose beneficiary is man6. Significantly, in the 
passage of the Consolatio ad Marciam we just quoted (18.5), he extols the 
beauty of cultivated fields with and before that of spontaneous vegetation 
(adiuta cultu seges et arbusta sine cultore feritatis); and his description 
culminates in the intervention of man on nature by means of the artes: 
disces docebisque artes, alias quae vitam instruant, alias quae ornent, alias 
quae regant (18.7: “you shall learn and teach the arts; some fulfill the needs 
of life, some make it pleasant, some direct it”). 
We can extract an even clearer message from a passage in the De benefi-
ciis, where the providential character of nature is confirmed and in which its 
beauty cannot be separated from its usefulness to mankind. And perhaps it is 
possible here to infer Seneca’s preference for those sights which, 
“innumerable, caress the eyes, the ears, the soul” (ben. 4.5.1 haec innume-
rabilia oculos, aures, animum mulcentia). We should at least note that 
human activity is an integral part of this picture: agriculture on land, sailing 
on water. There is, however, a characteristic detail which connects this 
moved and moving description of the beauty and the usefulness of nature, 
conceived of as a benefit of God to men and as a field open to their activity, 
with the passage of epistle 41, where wild and unspoiled nature was 
prominent. In both cases Seneca describes natural beauty not directly, but 
through a literary intermediation, namely through his beloved Vergil. In 
epistle 41 it was Vergil’s description of Capitol hill in its primeval state, 
where a divine presence was perceived; in the passage of the De beneficiis 
Seneca quotes the lines of the Georgics describing lake Como and lake 
Garda (georg. 2.159-160), and also those from Eclogues 1, in which Tityrus 
expresses his gratitude to the god who has allowed him to live peacefully on 
his land (ecl. 1.6-10). It would be wrong, however, to think that Seneca is 
able to feel and express the beauty of nature not directly, but only through 
the intermediation of literature. In reality, Vergil’s poetic word, though 
providing him with an extremely effective expressive tool, receives a new 
semantic charge through the philosophical nuances it acquires by being 
assumed as an integral part of Seneca’s philosophical discourse. The origi-
nality of our writer, as we have already remarked, is largely based on the 
fruitful convergence of his philosophical formation, which is Greek and 
Stoic, with his rhetorical and literary education, which is inevitably 
connected with the cultural milieu of contemporary Rome.  
At this point we must go back to what we have stated at the beginning: as 
  
 6 Seneca, however, does not share the somewhat petty conviction that everything in the 
universe was made for men. See A. Setaioli, Seneca and the Divine. Stoic Tradition and 
Personal Developments, “IJCT” 13, 2006-2007, 333-368. 
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a true Stoic, Seneca makes no distinction between aesthetical and ethical 
beauty, in as much as both are nothing but the manifestation of the Lovgo" in 
the world. Only by remembering this shall we be able to comprehend his 
attitude before the spectacle of nature. Of this specatcle he cannot have his 
fill (Helv. 8.6), and often he just views it as though he were seeing it for the 
first time (ep. 64.5). Seneca believes that the unspoiled nature in which the 
first men lived was nobler and more beautiful than the luxurious homes of 
the rich of his own times. Looking at the starry sky he feels a shiver reminis-
cent of the divina voluptas experienced by Lucretius while contemplating 
the universe (de rer. nat. 3.28). In a page of the Consolation to his mother 
Seneca’s tone rises above his usual: Helv. 8.2-6 (in exilio) quantulum est 
quod perdimus! duo, quae pulcherrima sunt, quocumque nos moverimus se-
quentur... natura communis et propria virtus... Mundus hic, quo nihil neque 
maius neque ornatius rerum natura genuit, <et> animus, contemplator ad-
miratorque mundi, pars eius magnificentissima, propria nobis et perpetua et 
tam diu nobiscum mansura sunt quamdiu ipsi manebimus... Proinde, dum 
oculi mei ab illo spectaculo, cuius insatiabiles sunt, non abducantur, dum 
mihi solem lunamque intueri liceat, dum ceteris inhaerere sideribus, dum 
ortus eorum occasusque et intervalla et causas investigare vel ocius meandi 
vel tardius, <dum> spectare tot per noctem stellas micantis et alias immobi-
les, alias non in magnum spatium exeuntes, sed intra suum se circumferen-
tes vestigium, quasdam subito erumpentes, quasdam igne fuso praestringen-
tes aciem, quasi decidant, vel longo tractu cum multa luce praetervolantes; 
dum cum his sim et caelestibus, qua homini fas est, immiscear, dum animum 
ad cognatarum rerum conspectum tendentem in sublimi semper habeam, 
quantum refert mea quid calcem? [“how little and paltry are the things we 
lose (in exile)! The most beautiful two will follow us no matter where we 
go: I mean nature, which belongs to everybody, and our own virtue... This 
universe, the greatest and most beautiful thing created by nature, and the 
soul, which contemplates and admires it, actually its most magnificent part, 
are ours for ever and shall remain with us for all of our life... And so, as long 
as this spectacle, of which my eyes cannot have their fill, is not removed 
from them, as long as I’m able to see the sun and the moon and to follow the 
other celestial bodies, to watch their rising and their setting, to investigate 
their periodical appearances and the causes of the acceleration or the 
slowing of their motion, to observe so many shining stars in the night, some 
motionless, others moving in a short orbit which they never leave, others 
which appear suddenly, still others striking our eyes with a fire that spreads 
out, as though they were falling, or crossing the sky leaving a long track of 
light – as long as I am able to contemplate all this and stay in contact with 
heavenly realities as far as it is permitted to mortals, as long as I can keep 
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my soul up high in contemplation of the things related to it, what do I care 
what my feet trample?”]. 
This long quotation allows us to gain an exact comprehension of the na-
ture of Seneca’s emotion: the beauty he sees in the universe is the manifesta-
tion of divine reason unfolding itself in nature. The philosopher feels he is 
himself part of it: the stars and the heavenly phenomena are cognatae res, 
“related entities”, for him; much more: his soul is the most magnificent part 
of the universe. It is apparent that Seneca’s sentiments before nature stem 
from the same roots from which his rapture before the superhuman beauty of 
the soul of the vir bonus also stemmed: in both he perceives the mark of the 
Stoic divinity, which manifests itself, in turn, as nature, reason, or fate, ac-
cording to the conception of Stoic monism. Therefore, by contemplating this 
beauty, one comes into contact with God. Similar passages are found else-
where too in Seneca’s writings. 
So, in the preface to the first book of the Naturales Quaestiones, where 
several of these themes reappear, we can easily notice that the contemplation 
of nature is a perfect equivalent of the contemplation of God. Facing God, 
Seneca does not lose himself in mysticism, like the medieval ascetics; quite 
on the contrary, he experiences an increase to the utmost degree of his ratio-
nal capabilities, which he turns towards the comprehension of the essence of 
the divine. He wants to “measure God” (§ 17 mensus deum), just like Dante 
in the last canto of his Paradise: Par. 33.133 ss.: “qual è ‘l geomètra che 
tutto s’affige / per misurar lo cerchio,... tal era io a quella vista nova” [“as 
the geometrician totally concentrates in measuring the circle,... such was I at 
that new sight (of God)”]. 
In a passage of the De providentia (prov. 1.2) Seneca, following a long 
tradition, mentions the order and the beauty of creation to prove that provi-
dence exists. This “cosmological proof” is undoubtedly directed to the read-
er. Seneca himself needs no proof, since he considers the contemplation of 
the cosmos as an equivalent of the direct contemplation of God.  
In Seneca’s view God is the ultimate artist – on this point he follows the 
ancient Greek conception of God bringing order to unorganized matter, thus 
making the universe into a kovsmo". The idea of diakovsmhsi" is crucial in 
Plato’s Timaeus and was also taken up by Stoicism, according to which the 
cosmos is the work of a pu`r tecnikovn, literally an “artist fire”, to be identi-
fied with God. Man has been created to admire this sight of unspeakable 
beauty: De ot. 5.3 curiosum nobis natura ingenium dedit et, artis ac pulchri-
tudinis suae conscia, spectatores nos tantis rerum spectaculis genuit, perditu-
ra fructum sui si tam magna, tam clara, tam subtiliter ducta, tam nitida et 
non uno genere formosa solitudini ostenderet (“Curiosity in us is a gift from 
Nature; conscious of her own artistry and beauty, she created us to be the 
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viewers of this wonderful show; her labor would have been in vain if she 
had contrived her works, so great, so bright, so finely executed, so brilliant 
and so rich in different beauties, only to show them to a desert”). That’s why 
nature has fashioned us upright and capable of raising our head towards the 
heavens. This is a widespread idea, which goes back to Chrysippus, and 
probably, beyond him, to Aristotle (cf. Cic. nat. deor. 2.37, with Pease’s 
comments, pp. 629-631). 
This is what gives rise to our desire for knowledge and scientific re-
search, because, as Seneca states immediately after the words we have just 
quoted, what we see of nature is so beautiful that it makes us wish to ap-
prehend even what does not fall under our eyes. Nature herself, that is God’s 
visible manifestation, has equipped us with the impulse towards knowledge 
and the capability to attain it; man’s duty is to cultivate and develop this 
impulse (ep. 120.4). This is the foundation of virtue (ep. 108.8; 94.29) and 
of every art (ben. 4.6.5-6). God himself has placed in our souls tot artium 
semina and he himself ex occulto producit ingenia (4.5.6), that is, he has 
sown in our souls the seeds of all arts and draws up genius from deep inside 
us. We should remember that already in the passage from the De otio which 
we have quoted Seneca mentioned the art of Nature: artis et pulchritudinis 
suae conscia. We should once more remark the Stoic turn Seneca gives to 
the traditional idea of art as imitation of nature, which he states again, as we 
have already seen, in epistle 65: omnis ars naturae imitatio est (ep. 65.3). 
We shall be able to grasp even better the meaning this idea acquires in 
Seneca if we compare these words with his definition of reason, in the 
following epistle: quid est ratio? naturae imitatio (“what is reason? The 
imitation of nature”, ep. 66.39). So, art and reason are both “imitations of 
nature”, in other words two ways of following the lead of the Lovgo" per-
vading nature, which is one and the same with the Stoic God. Nor shall we 
be surprised when Seneca tells us that Nature herself works by following her 
own art, which in turn produces her beauty (ot. 5.3). 
We must, however, be extremely careful in our interpretation of this idea 
of Seneca’s. First of all, we should not forget that for the ancients the con-
cept of “art” did not perfectly correspond to our own. Ars (tevcnh in Greek) 
had a semantic range far wider than our term “art”; basically it denoted a ca-
pability common to a number of men, but not to everybody; therefore, it in-
cluded not merely the products of artists, but also those of artisans and 
scholars7. Here we shall of course consider only those artes which can be 
included in our idea of “fine arts”, but it will be necessary to keep in mind 
  
7 Cf. e.g. M. Rieser, The Moral Basis of Seneca’s Aesthetics, in Actas del Congreso 
internacional de Filosofía en conmemoración de Séneca, Córdoba 1965-1966, II, 237-244. 
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that ancient categories do not exactly dovetail with ours in this area.  
This is not the time and place to tackle the general problem of division 
and subdivision of the arts as conceived of in antiquity. Seneca has devoted 
a whole letter to this question: epistle 88 (cf. also Marc. 18.7). This is an ex-
tremely important text, to which I have devoted several pages in my book 
Seneca e i Greci (pp. 316-322), but here it is of interest only in as much as 
Seneca places philosophy at the summit of all arts, or rather considers it the 
only real art, epitomizing and including all the others. At present, what we 
should retain is that, according to Seneca, all arts owe their origin to God, 
who has sown the seeds of them in the human soul. This position, well in 
keeping with the Stoic immanentism followed by Seneca, allows our philo-
sopher to proceed well beyond Plato’s doctrine, whose conception of art was 
strongly influenced by his dualism opposing the world of nature in which we 
live to the intelligible, and in his view only “real”, cosmos. To tell the truth, 
this happens in one single Senecan passage, which, however, appears to find 
an extremely interesting development in Seneca’s ideas about an issue 
which is itself aesthetically relevant and was pivotal in ancient literary 
theory, namely imitation in literature. 
In epistle 65 Seneca discusses the philosophical doctrine of causes by re-
ferring to Aristotle’s example of the statue8, whose causes are the material it 
is made of, the artist who makes it, the shape it receives, and the purpose for 
which it is made. Besides these four Aristotelian causes, Seneca tells us, 
there is, according to Plato, a fifth one: the “idea”, that is the model after 
which the statue, as well as everything else, was made. A similar concept 
appears in epistle 58, where the example is taken from a different art, namely 
painting (ep. 58.19-20; sculpture again appears in the next paragraph: 
58.21). To these twin epistles I have devoted several pages in my book al-
ready quoted, Seneca e i Greci (pp. 126-140). At present, what is most in-
teresting for us is a detail which we are going to illustrate. As he adds the 
mention of Platonic “ideas” to the four causes of Aristotle’s example of the 
statue ( cf. e.g. Aristot. phys. 2.3, 194 b 25), Seneca remarks: ep. 65.7 nihil 
autem ad rem pertinet, utrum foris (artifex) habeat exemplar, ad quod referat 
oculos, an intus, quod ibi ipse concepit et posuit (“it doesn’t matter whether 
the artist finds the model to look at outside, or he has conceived and placed 
it within himself”). So the artist can extract the model which he will clothe 
with a material form from inside himself – in other words, his work can be 
creation, not mere imitation. The idea is already found in Cicero (orator 9), 
who states – probably following a commonplace – that when Phidias was 
  
 8 For this reference to Aristotle see A. Setaioli, Seneca e i Greci. Citazioni e traduzioni 
nelle opere filosofiche, Bologna 1988, 160-164. 
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sculpting the famous statues of Zeus and Athena he had no external model, 
but ipsius in mente insidebat species pulchritudinis eximia quaedam, quam 
intuens in eaque defixus ad illius similitudinem artem et manum dirigebat 
(“in his mind dwelt a high vision of beauty and by viewing this he directed 
his art and his hand to reproduce it”). This is a far cry from Plato’s 
conception of art as “copy of a copy”. Similar ideas, however, are not 
lacking in the Platonism of Seneca’s age, as we can easily realize if we read, 
for example, an author like Albinos or Alkinoos (II century A.D.: cf. didasc. 
9), whose work was clearly meant to be a summary of Plato’s doctrines and 
an introduction to Platonism. 
We can observe something similar, as we have already hinted, in the way 
Seneca reverses the conception of literary imitation which prevailed in the 
rhetoric of his times. We do not have the time to sketch a complete picture 
of his attitude to this issue, which occupied a crucial place in ancient literary 
theory and criticism. I have devoted a good deal of space to it in another of 
my books: Facundus Seneca (pp. 197-215). Suffice it to say now that, mov-
ing from the traditional idea, which considered the writer a basically passive 
recipient of the stylistic and literary qualities of his models, Seneca goes as 
far as discovering in the relationship to the models a veritable process of a 
well active literary and cultural formation, which brings the writer to 
recreate in an original manner the material he receives from the models, and 
to proceed beyond them thanks to his own personal contribution. Naturally 
the stress is now not merely on stylistic qualities which must be acquired, 
but also, and predominantly, on a veritable cultural formation. Quite si-
gnificantly, Seneca reverses a metaphor which was current in rhetoric at 
least since Isocrates and repeatedly appears in rhetorical handbooks. This 
metaphor compared the model to a signet or seal and the imitator to a wax 
tablet receiving its imprint. By contrast Seneca states, not once but twice, 
that it is the writer’s task to print the image of his own soul on the material 
which comes from the models (ep. 84.8; 115.1; cf. Facundus Seneca, pp. 
210-211 for the Greek texts). Once more, we witness the fruitful interaction 
of Seneca’s philosophical and rhetorical culture. 
We have said that this idea is not completely developed in the text of 
epistle 65. If the conception of art as the imitation of nature which appears 
there must be read in the Stoic sense we have mentioned rather than in 
accordance with the disparaging Platonic view of art as copy of a copy, it 
remains, neverheless, that in the context of epistle 65 Seneca lists among the 
artist’s intentions money, glory, and religious piety (ep. 65.5), but not the 
disinterested fulfillment of artistic intent and ideal. But, as we shall presently 
see, there are more Senecan texts in which the latter is foremost. 
The most famous supporter of the idea of art as an imitation of nature in 
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antiquity was no doubt Aristotle. But whereas Aristotle, though considering 
art as mimesis, imitation par excellence, restored it to its dignity by referring 
it to the universal, Plato, as we said, had lowered it to a copy of nature, 
which in turn is the copy of intelligible ideas. It must be added, however, 
that we can also detect a quite different approach in Plato, which led the 
great Athenian to formulate a theory of art – or at least of poetry – as divine 
possession. 
A trace of the negative attitude to art, connected with the first of the two 
Platonic positions we have just mentioned, can be recognized in Seneca too, 
in spite of what we have been saying up to now. In a letter, while speaking 
of some animals, such as spiders weaving their cobwebs and bees building 
the honeycombs in the hive, he states that the art of men does not possess the 
marvelous regularity of this natural “art” which is born with the animal, with 
no need to be learned: ep. 121.23 incertum est et inaequabile quicquid ars 
tradit: ex aequo venit quod natura distribuit. Of course here Seneca is not 
speaking of our “fine arts”; we can recognize the more extensive conception 
of “art” held by the ancients; here Seneca is probably thinking of our “arts 
and crafts”. Still, it remains true that the ars of men can never hope to attain 
the “technical” perfection, so to speak, which appears in the works of nature. 
Attitudes of hostility to art appear in some typically moralistic contexts. 
Fine arts such as painting and sculpture are attacked as instruments of luxury 
and corruption (ep. 16.8; 88.18). And Seneca declares his disagreement with 
Posidonius, according to whom the “arts” (here understood as crafts and 
technical inventions) have been invented by philosophers and wise men (ep. 
90.7). 
There’s more: sometimes art finds an unsurmountable obstacle in matter, 
which is the cause of imperfection. This is true even in relation to the su-
preme artist, God, who, in his arrangement of the cosmos, could not change 
matter, which, by its resistance, brought about the seeming injustice of 
providence (prov. 5.9; cf. nat. quaest. 1 praef. 16). The origin of this idea is 
not Stoic, in as much as it supposes a dualism which cannot be reconciled 
with the Stoa’s monism. Dante, which takes up this idea from Seneca, 
applies it to the Aristotelian pattern of form and matter, with which it is 
much more in keeping [Par. 1.127-129 “forma non s’accorda / molte fiate 
all’intenzion dell’arte, / perch’a risponder la materia è sorda” (“oftentimes 
form does not fulfill the intention of art, because matter is reluctant to 
answer”)]. I have treated this problem in a paper I have presented last year at 
several American universities, which has now appeared in print in the 
“International Journal of the Classical Tradition”9. 
  
9 Cf. above, note 6. 
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A confirmation of the very likely assumption that in this Seneca is not 
being influenced directly by Plato but rather by the Platonism of his own 
time comes from a comparison with the eighth treatise of Plotinus’s fifth 
Ennead, titled “On Intelligible Beauty” (Peri; tou` nohtou` kavllou"). There, 
several elements we have found in Seneca reappear in a philosophically 
much more rigorous context. The central idea of this Plotinian treatise is that 
all beauty emanates from the divine Intellect (cf. also enn. 1.6 “On the 
Beautiful”, Peri; tou` kalou`), from which the universal Soul takes it to print 
it like a seal on perceptible objects. In human art the model is not material, 
but resides in the artist’s soul; and for Plotinus too art faces matter’s resis-
tance; matter can only acquire beauty in as much as it yields to art10. Of 
course Plotinus, consistently with his ideas, refuses the traditional concep-
tion of art as the imitation of nature, which, as we saw, still appears in 
Seneca. 
One can discuss at length, as indeed it has been the case, to determine 
whether the second of the two Platonic conceptions we have mentioned – the 
one which views art as divine possession – has or has not left any trace in 
Seneca, like the first one did. Actually, such traces exist and are easy to re-
cognize; the issue is really to determine whether Seneca has or has not con-
sciously accepted this doctrine. The texts which have been produced and dis-
cussed in this connection – first of all the final part of the De tranquillitate 
animi (esp. 17.10), which quotes a famous passage from Plato’s Phaedrus 
stating that a poet retaining a sober mind vainly knocks at the Muses’ door 
(Plat. Phaedr. 254a) – all concern a particular aesthetic activity, namely 
literature, which is also the area I have more especially investigated. For 
many years I have found myself on a position opposed to the one held by 
two scholars to whom I am linked by boundless admiration and brotherly 
friendship, namely Giancarlo Mazzoli and Mireille Armisen-Marchetti. 
Lately, however, our disagreement has been significantly reduced. 
First of all I would like to emphasize that I never thought that Seneca did 
not know the treatise Peri; u{you" (“On Sublimity”), nor that there are no 
traces of irrationalist literary doctrines in his writings; rather, I have always 
maintained that he could not accept irrationality as a goal in itself without 
ceasing to be a Stoic. Recently Mazzoli himself has acknowledged that in 
Seneca irrationality, or mota mens, is to be equated with a therapeutical 
shock aimed at recovering what at first sight might appear to be its exact op-
posite, that is bona mens, which is the way rationality manifests itself; and I 
have declared myself ready to agree on this point. From the very beginning, 
  
10  Cf.  e.g.  E. De Keyser,  La signification de l’art dans les Ennéades de Plotin,  1955, 
39 ff. 
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however, I have found on my side such a great scholar as Alfonso Traina, 
who, among his many other merits, has made decisive contributions to 
Senecan scholarship. Down to his latest paper, in the “Festschrift” published 
for my retirement, he states his agreement with me on this problem11. It is 
hardly worthwhile continuing an already too long discussion. 
To go back to the question previously raised, we shall stress once more 
that the idea that art has its own purpose in itself with no further and non-
disinterested ends, is not foreign to Seneca. It is also interesting that, as we 
shall presently see, he formulates this idea also referring to other authorities. 
In the De beneficiis (2.33.2), while maintaining that a benefit is perfectly ac-
complished even if the recipient does not return it, Seneca resorts to the 
example of Phidias, who perfecit opus suum, etiam si non vendidit (“has ac-
complished his work, even if he was not able to sell it”). From the purely ar-
tistic point of view, the artist’s success is measured by the carrying out of his 
artistic project (fecisse quod voluit): glory and material advantages are only 
accessory. The artist’s reward is art itself. Interestingly enough, in this text 
Seneca establishes a distinction between ars and artificium; the latter no 
doubt denotes the craft or trade, whereas ars, this time, does correspond to 
what we mean by “art”: ben. 2.33.2 alius est fructus artis, alius artifici: artis 
est fecisse quod voluit, artificii fecisse cum fructu; perfecit opus suum 
Phidias, etiam si non vendidit. Triplex illi fructus est operis sui: unus con-
scientiae; hunc absoluto opere percipit; alter famae; tertius utilitatis, quem 
adlatura est aut gratia aut venditio aut aliqua commoditas [“the fruit of art 
and the fruit of trade (artifici) are different: the fruit of art consists in having 
carried out what the artist intended, the fruit of trade in having done so in a 
‘fruitful’ way; the work of Phidias is accomplished, even if he was not able 
to sell it. He gets a triple profit from his work: in the first place the con-
sciousness of having succeeded, which stems from the accomplishment of 
the work; secondly, glory; in the third place an advantage which may come 
from somebody’s favor, the selling of the work, or any other benefit”]. We 
should however notice that Seneca is not actually speaking of the essence 
and nature of art, but rather of the “satisfaction” (fructus) which the artist 
gets out of it. And this very term – fructus – is rather ambiguously referred 
both to ars and to artificium: the ambiguity is clearly apparent when Seneca 
tells us that the fructus of artificium is fecisse cum fructu, a formula which 
repeats in the explanation the term to be explained, though in a clearly ma-
terial meaning; it remains that the fructus of ars consists simply in fecisse 
  
11   A. Traina,   Observatio sui.  Sul  linguaggio dell’interiorità nel  De tranquillitate 
animi di Seneca, in  Concentus ex dissonis. Scritti in onore di Aldo Setaioli,  Napoli 2006,  II, 
740. 
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quod voluit, that is in carrying out the artistic intention or project. Clearly, in 
this context fructus means in turn both artistic satisfaction and economic 
profit. 
It is nevertheless remarkable that Seneca has made a clear distinction 
between disinterested art on the one hand and craft or trade on the other – the 
latter’s goal being profit. In the same way, in the Naturales quaestiones (4a 
praef. 14) Lucilius is praised for devoting himself to poetry, which is some-
thing gratuitum, that is, totally disinterested. Possibly the traditional aristo-
cratic conception of the “liberal arts” as opposed to the practical and self-in-
terested bavnausoi tevcnai is still at work here. Seneca retains this distinction 
even in epistle 88, where he strives to provide a new philosophical founda-
tion to the concept of “liberal arts”. As a matter of fact this letter begins with 
a blunt and very traditional statement: nullum in bonis numero quod ad aes 
exit (“I do not count among good things anything which boils down to 
money”); and of course everything we would consider “fine arts” is included 
in this class. But, quite differently from epistle 88, our text from the De be-
neficiis establishes a clear distinction between disinterested art on the one 
hand and craft or trade bent on profit on the other. 
If the artist’s reward is art itself, it follows that the most gratifying mo-
ment for him is the time he spends fashioning his work. In Seneca this idea 
is formulated very seriously, with no trace of the humor we find in Catullus 
(22.15-17)  or Horace (epist. 2.2.107) when they portray the satisfaction 
even mean poets get out of their poetic activity. Seneca refers to his former 
teacher Attalus, who had said that the process of making a friend provides 
more satisfaction than already having one, “just like”, he went on, “for the 
artist painting is more agreeable than having painted” (ep. 9.7 quomodo arti-
fici iucundius pingere est quam pinxisse). Seneca comments on this by stat-
ing that, once he has achieved his work, the artist enjoys only the “product” 
– fructus – of his art (here we have a third meaning of the term fructus as 
applied to the area of art), whereas in the progress of his activity he enjoyed 
art itself: ep. 9.7 iam fructu artis suae fruitur: ipsa fruebatur arte cum pinge-
ret. So the power of art reveals itself mainly during artistic activity – we can-
not speak of totally autonomous creation, since in the context art is put on a 
par with two other activities (making a friend and raising a child) which, 
though more agreeable in themselves than the goal they strive to attain, are 
nevertheless understood as a preparation to that goal, and therefore suppose 
an eminently practical end. We should rather note that Seneca places himself 
from the point of view of the artist; this is no doubt a sign of his pre-eminent 
interest for the human factor, that is for the ethical and practical side, rather 
than for abstract problems. Art is not considered in itself, in its essence and 
nature, nor as an object of contemplation for the public, but in relation to the 
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human subject: the artist.  
The same is true for another interesting text, though the value of art in and 
for itself is stressed more clearly than in other Senecan passages. We should 
emphasize that, just like in the previous instance Seneca referred to his for-
mer teacher Attalus, here he reports the thought of an unknown, though with 
explicit approval. In epistle 7 (ep. 7.10-11) he quotes three sayings which 
reflect the aristocratic conception of art (and knowledge) as an ideal acces-
sible only to a small number of connoisseurs or as a difficult conquest meant 
just for a small elite. This is an idea appearing in philosophy ever since the 
pre-Socratics and, in literature, from Hellenism onwards – at Rome starting 
with the poetae novi. The second of these sayings effectively expresses the 
idea that art is a value in itself; it is reported as the reply of an artist to those 
who asked why he was so careful in fashioning works which very few peo-
ple would get to know: satis sunt mihi pauci, satis est unus, satis est nullus 
(ep. 7.11: “I am content with few, I am content with one, I am content with 
no one”). The rhetorical figure of anticlimax marking the literary form of this 
sentence should not lead us to think that it does not express a sincere convic-
tion. As felicitously observed by Alfonso Traina, in Seneca thought becomes 
style. We can therefore conclude that his statement that art has no need for 
admirers is tantamount to proclaiming that it is itself an absolute value. 
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